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The syntax of modal graphs is defined in terms of the continuous cut and broken cut following
Charles Peirce’s notation in the gamma part of his graphical logic of existential graphs. Graphical
calculi for normal modal logics are developed based on a reformulation of the graphical calculus
for classical propositional logic. These graphical calculi are of the nature of deep inference. The
relationship between graphical calculi and sequent calculi for modal logics is shown by translations
between graphs and modal formulas.
1 Introduction
Sequent calculi for normal modal logics can be obtained uniformly from a basic calculus, as has been
observed in [23]. The search for generalized cut-free sequent calculi for modal logics has produced
display calculus ([3]), hypersequent calculus ([2]), labelled sequent calculus ([10]), hybrid logic calculus
([18]), and deep sequent calculus ([7, 8, 21, 22]). Among these efforts, there are two main approaches.
One is the semantic approach; the other largely syntactic. In the semantic approach, labelled calculi exist
for a number of complete modal logics. The syntactic approach does not use labels. Each sequent has an
obvious corresponding formula. Ordinary sequent calculi and hypersequent calculi for modal logics are
syntactic.
Deep inference systems for modal logics, such as deep sequent calculi developed by Bru¨nnler [7, 8]
and Stouppa [22], are also largely syntactic. There exists also deep inference for hybrid logic ([19]).
The syntax of deep sequents is defined by assuming the negation normal form in classical modal logic
and nested sequents. The central idea of deep inference is that deep structures are transformed into
appropriate shapes at any position in a derivation that allows the transformation. It has turned out that
cut-free sequent calculi can be developed systematically and modularly for normal modal logics.
As often is the case, what is syntactic and what semantic may interestingly overlap, as is the case
in the hybrid and two-sided approaches. Also in the graphical and diagrammatic systems the distinction
between syntax and semantics is not, and was not originally meant to be by Peirce, razor-sharp, which
professes to gain some flexibility when dealing with some more complicated and non-standard systems.
The aim of the present paper is to provide a different kind of deep inference system for normal
modal logics. The language is given by Peirce’s alpha and gamma graphs as presented in his theory of
existential graphs (see e.g. [13, 14, 17, 24]). Graphs are scribed on the sheet of assertion. Inference rules
are formulated as transformation rules from one graph to another graph. In non-modal propositional
logic (alpha graphs) and first-order logic (beta graphs), there are basically only two general kinds of
transformations: insertions to the graphs and erasures from the graphs. In graphical modal logic, there
are two additional kinds of transformations: merges and splits. In a sense also merges and splits are
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instances of the operations of insertions and erasures. Thus the fundamental proof rules also in the
modal extensions of graphical logic can be classified into two general classes. As usual, these operations
are allowed only in certain positions in a graph. It is the notion of a position that is made explicit in
graphical logic. This makes such graphical calculi the natural home for deep inference.
Peirce’s theory of existential graphs was generalized into conceptual graphs by Sowa [20] in 1984.
Since then conceptual graphs have been widely used within artificial intelligence and cognitive science.
Diagrammatic reasoning and their history and philosophy has been studied for many years (see e.g. [1,
15, 16]). As far as modal logics are concerned, van den Berg [4] defines a graphical system for modal
logic K which is complete with respect to the Hilbert-style axiomatic system of K. Brau¨ner [5] defines a
Peircean graphical system for the modal logic S5, which is also complete with respect to the Hilbert-style
axiomatic system of S5. This type of graphical system is also extended by Brau¨ner and Øhrstrøm [6] to
modal logics S4 and KD45. In distinction from the above works, the graphical systems for modal logics
presented in this paper are shown to be equivalent to algebraic sequent systems. This means that a range
of modal graphical systems can be developed in a systematic and modular fashion.
2 The syntax of modal graphs
We fix a denumerable set of simple propositions Prop the elements of which are primitive graphs. They
occur in a compound graph as basic parts. According to Peirce, the sheet of assertion, or the blank where
nothing is scribed on it, is also a primitive graph. It corresponds to tautology ⊤. Henceforth, we denote
the blank by SA or omit it altogether when no confusion arises. A primitive graph is a simple proposition
or the blank (SA).
The modal graphs are defined inductively from primitive graphs using two special notations: the
continuous cut and the broken cut . The continuous cut means negation. The broken cut means
logical contingency (non-necessity). The continuous and broken cuts are called primitive cuts uniformly.
There are four combinations of cuts:
(1) Double continuous cut: ;
(2) Double broken cut: ;
(3) Possibility cut: ;
(4) Necessity cut: .
The compound cuts consist of two cuts, one nested within the other, with nothing between them. The
two primitive cuts and the four compound cuts stated above are called cuts uniformly. They are used as
single graph operations that form new graphs from the given ones.
Definition 1. The set of all modal graphs GM is defined inductively by:
GM ∋ G ::= p | SA | G | G | G1G2
where p ∈ Prop. The graphs G and G are read as “the continuous cut of G” and “the broken cut of
G” respectively. The graph G1G2 is called the juxtaposition of G1 and G2 on the sheet of assertion.
Henceforth, when we talk about graphs we mean modal graphs. Given two graphs G and H , we
define shorthand notations G>H , G⊃ H and G≡ H as below:
G>H := G H ; G⊃H := G H ; G≡ H := G H H G .
Definition 2. For any graph G, the parsing tree of G, denoted by T (G), is defined inductively as follows:
1. T (p) is a single root node p.
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2. T (SA) is a single root node SA.
3. T (G1G2) is a root node G1G2 with children nodes T (G1) and T (G2).
4. T ( G ) is a root node G with one child node T (G).
5. T ( G ) is a root node G with one child node T (G).
A partial graph of a graph G is a node in T (G).
For any graph G, the history of a node J in T (G), denoted by h(J), is the unique path from the root
to J. The position of the root is always on the sheet of assertion. We say that J is a positive (negative)
node of T (G) if there is an even (odd) number of cuts in h(J).
A position is a point on the area of a graph (but not on the boundary of the cut). Given any graph G,
a position in G is positive (negative) if it is enclosed by an even (odd) number of cuts. Graph are scribed
at positions. No two graphs, or their parts, can be scribed at the same position.
A graph context is a graph G{ }with a single slot { }, the empty context, which can be filled by other
graphs. The notation G{H} stands for the graph obtained from the graph context G{ } by filling the slot
by H . An occurrence of a graph J in a graph G is called positive (negative), notation G{J+} (G{J−}), if
it is a positive (negative) node in T (G).
3 The graphical calculi Kg
Graphical calculi for modal logics are presented by graphical rules. In general, a graphical rule is of the
form
G
H
where G and H are graphs. The graph G is called the premiss, and H is called the conclusion.
On the sheet of assertion, the syntax of graphs becomes diagrammatic. This means that the syntax is
two-dimensional, it has no separate notation for parentheses, and that its well-formed graphs are scribed
in the ambient space which is continuous, compact, open and non-oriented. The following equalities can
be thought of as identifying graphs:
(PM) G{H1H2}= G{H2H1}; (AS) G{H1(H2H3)}= G{(H1H2)H3}.
The permutation (PM) says that to distinguish positions of H1 and H2 in a partial graph H1H2 of G has no
significance. The associativity (AS) says that the order of forming the graphs indicated by the parentheses
in these rules is likewise immaterial. After all, these equalities follow from the basic properties of the
space and therefore need no separate statement in the system. Likewise, if two graphs, G and H , are
asserted on the sheet of assertion, the the juxtaposition of them, G H , is at once also asserted.
The continuous and broken cuts have different meanings in general. However, the continuous cut of
SA is tantamount to the broken cut of SA in the sense that it is impossible to falsify a tautology. Hence
we assume the following equality:
(Normality) =
This equality says that contradiction is impossible. Its algebraic meaning is the normality condition in
modal algebras (Section 5).
Definition 3. The graphical calculus Kg for the minimal normal modal logic K consists of the following
axiom and graphical rules:
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1. Axiom: SA (The Sheet of Assertion)
2. Alpha rules:
• Deletion:
G{H+}
G{SA}
(DEL)
Every positive partial graph H in a graph G can be deleted.
• Insertion:
G{H−}
G{(JH)−}
(INS)
Any graph can be inserted into a negative position in a graph G.
• Double cut:
G{H}
(DC1)
G{ H }
G{ H }
(DC2)
G{H}
Any partial graph H of a graph G can be replaced by the double cut of H, and vice versa.
• Iteration/deiteration:
K{GH{J}}
K{GH{GJ}}
(IT)
K{GH{GJ}}
K{GH{J}}
(DEIT)
where H{ } is a broken-cut-free graph context, namely, no broken cut occurs in H{ }. In a
graph K{GH{J}}, the partial graph G can be iterated or deiterated at any position in H.
3. Modal rules:
J{ GH }
(K1)
J{ G H }
J{ G H }
(K2)
J{ GH }
J{(G⊃ H)+}
(DMN)
J{( H ⊃ G )+}
(K1) and (K2) mean that the necessity cut distributes over juxtaposition. We call the rule (K1)
splitting and (K2) merging. (DMN) is the rule of downward monotonicity.
A proof of a graph G in Kg is a finite sequence of graphs G0, . . . ,Gn such that Gn =G, and each Gi is
either SA or derived from previous graphs by a rule in Kg. A graph G is provable in Kg, notation ⊢Kg G,
if it has a proof in Kg. A graphical derivation of H from G is admissible in Kg, if ⊢Kg G implies ⊢Kg H .
Remark 1. The restriction on the context H{ } in (IT) and (DEIT) rules is significant. Iteration/de-
iteration in a modal context may lead to invalid inferences. For example, consider the following two
inferences where the rules (IT) and (DEIT) are applied into the broken cut:
p q ⊃ p q
p q ⊃ p pq
(I)
p q ⊃ p q
p p q ⊃ p q
(II)
The premisses of (I) and (II) are valid, but their conclusions are not valid in the algebraic semantics
for Kg (Section 5). (I) is a counterexample to the validity of iteration into broken cut, and (II) is a
counterexample to the validity of deiteration from a broken cut.
Lemma 1. The graphs G⊃ SA and G⊃ G are derivable in Kg.
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Proof. We have the following proofs:
SA (DC1)
(INS)
G
SA (DC1)
(INS)
G
(IT)
G G
This completes the proof.
Proposition 1. The following rules are admissible in Kg:
1. De Morgan rules:
GH
(DM1)
G > H
G > H
(DM2)
GH
2. Contraposition and transitivity rules:
G⊃ H
H ⊃ G
(CP)
G⊃H H ⊃ J
G⊃ J
(TR)
3. Prefixing and Modus Ponens:
G
H ⊃ G
(PF)
G G⊃ H
H
(MP)
4. Lattice rules:
Gi ⊃ H
G1G2 ⊃ H
(&L)
G⊃H G⊃ J
G⊃ HJ
(&R)
G⊃ J H ⊃ J
G>H ⊃ J
(>L)
G⊃ Hi
G⊃ H1 >H2
(>L)
G⊃ H > J
H G⊃ J
(NL)
GH ⊃ J
H ⊃ G > J
(NR)
5. Residuation rules:
GH ⊃ J
G⊃ (H ⊃ J)
(RG1)
G⊃ (H ⊃ J)
GH ⊃ J
(RG2)
6. Distributivity:
G H J
(D1)
G H G J
G H G J
(D2)
G H J
7. Upward monotonicity:
G⊃ H (UMN)
G ⊃ H
G⊃H (UMP)
G ⊃ H
G⊃ H (UMDB)
G ⊃ H
8. Replacement of equivalents:
G≡ H
J{G} ≡ J{H}
(RE)
9. Necessitation rule:
G
G
(Nec)
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Proof. For (DM1) and (DM2), we have the following simple proofs that only use the double-cut rules:
GH
(DC1)
G H
(DC1)
G H
G H
(DC2)
G H
(DC2)
GH
(TR) is shown as follows:
G J J H
(IT)
G J J H
(DEIT)
G J H
(DEL)
G H
(DC2)
G H
For (D1) and (D2), we have the following proofs ([9]):
G H J
(IT)
G GH J
(IT)
G GH GJ
(DEL)
GH GJ
GH GJ
(IT)
GH GJ GH GJ
(4 times DEL)
G G H J
(DEIT)
G H J
(DC2)
G H J
The rule (RE) is shown by induction on the construction of J{ } as follows. AssumeG≡H . If J{ }= { },
the conclusion is the same as the premiss. Suppose J{ } = J′{ } . By induction hypothesis, we have
J′{G} ≡ J′{H}. Then it is easy to show J′{G} ≡ J′{H} . Assume J{ } = J1J2{ }. By induction
hypothesis, we have J2{G} ≡ J2{H}. Then it is easy to show J1J2{G} ≡ J1J2{H}.
The rule (UMN) is obtained from (DMN) by the rule of contraposition (CP). (Nec) is shown by (PF),
(UMN) and (TR). The other rules are easily shown.
Theorem 1 (Cut-elimination). The following cut-elimination rule
J{ G G }
(Cut-E)
J{SA}
is admissible in Kg.
Proof. Clearly G G ≡ SA is provable in Kg. By (RE), we have J{ G G } ≡ J{SA}. Assume
⊢Kg J{ G G }. By (TR), we have ⊢Kg J{SA}.
4 Extensions
Extensions of Kg can be obtained by adding some characteristic rules. The formulation of these char-
acteristic rules will make use of the cuts, including the six cuts (two primitive and four combined ones)
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we introduced in Section 2. We say that the occurrence of a cut in a graph is positive (negative) if it is
enclosed evenly (oddly) by primitive cuts (continuous or broken cuts).
A normal modal graphical calculus is an extension of Kg with a set of graphical rules. Given a set
of rules Σ = {Ri | i ∈ I}, the notation KΣ denotes the calculus generated by rules in Σ. Let us have the
following rules of transformation as the basic rules for various systems of graphical modal logic:
(D) Any positive necessity cut can be transformed into a possibility cut. Any negative possibility cut
can be transformed into a necessity cut.
J{ G
+
}
J{ G
+
}
(D+)
J{ G
−
}
J{ G
−
}
(D−)
(T ) Any positive continuous cut can be transformed into a broken cut. Any negative broken cut can be
transformed into a continuous cut.
J{ G
+
}
J{ G
+
}
(T+)
J{ G
−
}
J{ G
−
}
(T−)
(4) Any positive necessity cut can be doubled. Any negative possibility cut can be doubled.
J{ G
+
}
J{ G
+
}
(4+)
J{ G
−
}
J{ G
−
}
(4−)
(B) Any positive double broken cut can be deleted. Any double broken cut can be inserted into a
negative position.
J{ G
+
}
J{G+}
(B+)
J{G−}
J{ G
−
}
(B−)
(5) Any positive double broken cut can be transformed into a necessity cut. Any negative possibility
cut can be transformed into a double broken cut.
J{ G
+
}
J{ G
+
}
(5+)
J{ G
−
}
J{ G
−
}
(5−)
Definition 4. Let (X) = {(X+),(X−)} for X ∈ {D,T,4,B,5}. We define the following graphical calculi:
KDg = Kg(D) KBg = Kg(B) K4g = Kg(4)
K5g = Kg(5) KTg = Kg(T ) KDBg = KDg(B)
KB4g = KBg(4) KD4g = KDg(4) KD5g = KDg(5)
KB5g = KBg(5) K45g = K4g(5) KTBg = KTg(B)
S4g = KTg(4) S5g = KTg(5)
Let S be any one of the systems in Definition 4. Let S+ and S− be the systems obtained from S by
dropping the negative and positive rules respectively.
Theorem 2. S+ = S = S−.
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Proof. Consider KT+ = Kg(T
+). It suffices to show that (T−) is provable in KT+. Assume that
J{ G
−
} is provable in KT+. There are two cases:
Case 1. J{ G
−
} = J′ H G . First, it is easy to prove G ⊃ G in KT+. Then we have the
following proof:
G ⊃ G
(&L)
H G ⊃ G G ⊃ G
(TR)
H G ⊃ G
H ⊃ H
(&L)
H G ⊃ H
(&R)
H G ⊃H G
(DMN)
H G ⊃ H G
(Alpha rules)
J′ H G ⊃ J′ H G
Case 2. J{ G
−
}= J′ H G . We have the following proof:
G ⊃ G
(Alpha rules)
H G ⊃ H G
(CP)
H G ⊃ H G
(Alpha rules)
J′ H G ⊃ J′ H G
Hence (T−) is provable in KT+. The remaining cases of S are shown similarly.
5 Graphical and sequent calculi
The set of all modal formulas LM is defined by the following inductive rule:
LM ∋ α ::= p | ⊤ | ¬α | (α ∧α) |α ,
where p ∈ Prop. Other propositional connectives ⊥,∨,→ and↔ are defined as usual. The dual operator
of ♦ is defined as ♦α := ¬¬α . A basic sequent is an expression of the form α ⊢ β .
Definition 5. The basic sequent calculus SK consists of the following axioms and rules:
(1) Axioms:
(Id) α ⊢ α , (⊤) α ⊢ ⊤, (D) α ∧ (β ∨ γ) ⊢ (α ∧β )∨ (α ∧ γ),
(Em) ⊤ ⊢ α ∨¬α , (Gen) ⊤ ⊢⊤, (∧) α ∧β ⊢(α ∧β ).
(2) Rules for propositional connectives:
¬α ⊢ β
(¬L)
¬β ⊢ α
α ⊢ ¬β
(¬R)
β ⊢ ¬α
α ⊢ β β ⊢ γ
α ⊢ γ
(Tr)
αi ⊢ β
(∧L)(i= 1,2)
α1∧α2 ⊢ β
β ⊢ α1 β ⊢ α2
(∧R)
β ⊢ α1∧α2
(3) Modal rule:
α ⊢ β
α ⊢β
()
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By the standard Lindenbaum–Tarski construction, one can easily obtain the following completeness
result:
Theorem 3. A sequent is derivable in SK iff it is valid in all modal algebras.
We shall present the translations between the modal language LM and the graphical language GM ,
and then prove the connections between the graphical calculus Kg and the sequent calculus SK.
Definition 6. The translation pi : GM →LM is defined inductively by
pi(p) = p; pi(SA) =⊤; pi( G ) = ¬pi(G);
pi( G ) = ♦¬pi(G); pi(G1 G2) = pi(G1)∧pi(G2).
The translation σ : LM → GM is defined inductively by
σ(p) = p; σ(⊤) = SA; σ(¬ϕ) = σ(ϕ) ;
σ(ϕ) = σ(ϕ) ; σ(ϕ1∧ϕ2) = σ(ϕ1) σ(ϕ2).
The two translations pi and σ are related to each other. The relationship can be presented by the
following result:
Proposition 2. There are functions δ : LM →LM and ρ : GM → GM such that the following diagrams
commute:
b b
b
LM GM
LM
σ
δ
pi
(I)
b b
b
GM LM
GM
pi
ρ σ
(II)
i.e., pi ◦σ = δ and σ ◦pi = ρ .
Proof. As we are using them later on, let us first define the two (redundant) functions δ and ρ as follows.
Define the function δ inductively by: δ (p) = p, δ (⊤) =⊤, δ (ϕ1∧ϕ2) = δ (ϕ1)∧δ (ϕ2), and δ (φ) =
¬♦¬ϕ . By induction on the construction of a modal formula ϕ one can easily show σ(pi(ϕ)) = δ (ϕ).
Hence (I) commutes. Define the function ρ inductively as follows:
ρ(p) = p, ρ(SA) = SA, ρ(G1 G2) = G1 G2,
ρ( G ) = G , ρ( G ) = G .
By induction on the construction of a graph G one can easily show that σ(pi(G)) = ρ(G). Hence (II)
commutes.
A formula context is a formula structure α{ }with a single slot { }which can be filled with a formula.
Let α{β} be the formula obtained from α{ } by filling the slot by β . The notation α{β+} stands for
that β is positive in α , i.e., β is in the scope of an even number of negation symbols. Similarly we use
the notation α{β−}.
Lemma 2. The following hold in SK:
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(1) if α{β+} and β ⊢SK γ , then α{β} ⊢SK α{γ}.
(2) if α{β−} and β ⊢SK γ , then α{γ} ⊢SK α{β}.
(3) if β ⊢SK γ and γ ⊢SK β , then α{β} ⊢SK α{γ} and α{γ} ⊢SK α{β}.
Proof. By induction on the construction of α{ }. We sketch the proof of (1) and (2) by simultaneous
induction. The case α{ }= { } is obvious. Suppose α{β} :=¬α ′{β} and β ⊢SK γ . There are two cases:
Case 1. ¬α ′{β+}. Then α ′{β−}. By induction hypothesis, we have α ′{γ} ⊢SK α
′{β}. Then
¬α ′{β} ⊢SK ¬α
′{γ}.
Case 2. ¬α ′{β−}. Then α ′{β+}. By induction hypothesis, we have α ′{β} ⊢SK α
′{γ}. Then
¬α ′{γ} ⊢SK ¬α
′{β}.
The case α{ }= α1{ }∧α2 or α{ }= α1∧α2{ } is obvious. Suppose α{ }=α
′{ } and β ⊢SK γ .
Assume α ′{β+}. Then by induction hypothesis we have α ′{β} ⊢SK α
′{γ}. Then by () we have
α ′{β} ⊢SK α
′{γ}. The case for α ′{β−} is similar.
Lemma 3. For any graph G, if ⊢Kg G, then ⊤ ⊢SK pi(G).
Proof. Assume ⊢Kg G. Let G0, . . . ,Gn = G be a proof of G. We show ⊤ ⊢SK pi(Gi) by induction on
i ≤ n. If Gi is SA, clearly we have ⊤ ⊢SK pi(Gi). Assume that Gi is obtained from G
′ by a rule (R). If
(R) is an alpha rule, it is easy to get the conclusion by induction hypothesis and Lemma 2. Suppose that
(R) is a modal rule.
(1). (R) = (K1) or (K2). Let Gi = J{ H K } and G
′ = J{ HK }. By induction hypothesis, we
have ⊤ ⊢SK pi(J){pi( HK )}, i.e., ⊤ ⊢SK pi(J){¬♦¬(pi(H)∧pi(K))}. Clearly ¬♦¬(pi(H)∧pi(K)) ⊢SK
¬♦¬pi(H)∧¬♦¬pi(K) and ¬♦¬pi(H)∧¬♦¬pi(K) ⊢SK ¬♦¬(pi(H)∧pi(K)). By Lemma 2 (3), we get
⊤ ⊢SK pi(Gi). The case for (K2) is similar.
(2). (R) = (DMN). Let Gi = J{( K ⊃ H )
+} and G′ = J{(H ⊃ K)+}. By induction hypothesis,
we have ⊤ ⊢SK pi(J{(H ⊃ K)
+}), i.e., ⊤ ⊢SK pi(J){¬(pi(H)∧pi(K))}. Clearly, ¬(pi(H)∧¬pi(K)) ⊢SK
¬(♦¬pi(K)∧♦¬¬pi(H)). By Lemma 2 (1), we get ⊤ ⊢SK pi(Gi).
Lemma 4. For any formula α , if ⊤ ⊢SK α , then ⊢Kg σ(α).
Proof. By induction on the derivation of ⊤ ⊢ α in SK. The proof is omitted.
Lemma 5. For any graph G, ⊢Kg G iff ⊢Kg ρ(G).
Proof. By induction on the proof of G in Kg. The proof is omitted.
Theorem 4. For any graph G, ⊢Kg G iff ⊤ ⊢SK pi(G).
Proof. The ‘only if’ part is obtained by Lemma 3. Assume ⊤ ⊢SK pi(G). By Lemma 4, we have ⊢Kg
σ ◦pi(G). By Proposition 2, ⊢Kg ρ(G). By Lemma 5, ⊢Kg G.
Definition 7. A modal algebra is an algebra A= (A,∧,¬,,1) where (A,∧,¬,1) is a Boolean algebra,
and  is a unary operator on A satisfying the conditions:
1. Additivity: for all a,b ∈ A, (a∧b) =a∧b;
2. Normality: 1= 1.
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Any formula α is interpreted as a function αA in a modal algebra A. A sequent α ⊢ β is valid in A
if αA ≤ βA whatever elements of A are assigned to variables in α or β . By the standard Lindenbaum–
Tarski construction, one can show the completeness of SKwith respect to the class of all modal algebras,
i.e., α ⊢SK β if and only if α ⊢ β is valid in all modal algebras (Theorem 3).
A graph G is interpreted as the function GA = pi(G)A. A graph G is valid in a modal algebra A if
⊤ ⊢ pi(G) is valid in A. Then one can obtain the following completeness result:
Theorem 5. A graph G is provable in Kg iff it is valid in all modal algebras.
Proof. The soundness is shown by induction on the proof of G. For completeness, assume 6⊢Kg G.
By Theorem 4, we have ⊤ 6⊢SK pi(G). By the completeness of SK, there is a modal algebra A with
1 6≤ pi(G)A. Then G is not valid in A.
For any set of modal formulas Σ, let Σ≤ = {⊤ ⊢ α | α ∈ Σ}. Then we have the basic sequent calculus
SKΣ⊢ which is obtained from SK by adding all sequents in Σ≤ as axioms. Let Alg(Σ) be the class of all
modal algebras that validate all sequents in Σ⊢. Then the sequent system SKΣ⊢, if consistent, is sound
and complete with respect to Alg(Σ).
For any set of modal formulas Σ, consider the set of graphical rules Σg = {⊤ ⊢ σ(α) | α ∈ Σ}. Let
KgΣ
g be the graphical calculus obtained from Kg by adding all rules in Σ
g.
For Σ ⊆ {D,T,4,B,5}, where D = ♦⊤, T = α → α , 4 = α → α , B = α → ♦α and 5 =
♦α →♦α , one can show that the calculus KgΣ
g is equivalent to SKΣ⊢ by the translation pi . The proof
is similar to Theorem 4. Moreover, the graphical calculi KgΣ
g are sound and complete with respect to
Alg(Σ).
6 Conclusion
Graphical calculi for modal logics developed in the present paper are systematic and modular. They
are modal graphical versions of Gentzen-style sequent systems. They follow closely Peirce’s original
presentation in another sense as well: the rules arise systematically from Peirce’s presentation of broken-
cut gamma graphs and their rules (R 467, 478). Only (DMN), (B) and (5) are new.1 In the basic
system Kg, identifying a vacant broken-cut with a vacant continuous cut dispenses with necessitation
as a primitive rule. Moreover, the basic rules are perfectly symmetrical. Thanks to the diagrammatic
syntax, graphs need not assume negation normal form. Thus there are good prospects for developing
deep inference proof systems for non-normal and intuitionistic modal logics in a similar fashion. The
notions of position in the areas of cuts and the polarity of positions likewise result immediately from the
diagrammatic language that these systems are built upon. Thus diagrammatic syntax can be considered
1We find Peirce’s own remarks suggesting that he was not keen to have (B) or (5) as rules in his modal gamma systems:
“There is not much utility in a double broken cut. Yet it may be worth notice that g and g can neither of the be inferred from
the other. The outer of the two broken cuts is not only relative to a state of information but to a state of reflection. The graph
g asserts that it is possible that the truth of the graph g is necessary. It is only because I have not sufficiently reflected upon
the subject that I can have any doubt of whether it is so or not” (R 467, 1903). The rule (5) uses a principle that is contrary
to Peirce’s own rules of (T+) and (T−). Since Peirce’s preferred interpretation of the broken cut modality was an epistemic
one, he would not have recommended (5) as a good rule for knowledge. The previous quotation indeed continues as follows:
“It becomes evident, in this way, that a modal proposition is a simple assertion not about the universe of things but about the
universe of facts that one is in a state of information sufficient to know. The graph g without any selective, merely asserts
that there is a possible state of information in which the knower is not in a condition to know that the graph g is true, while g
asserts that there is no such possible state of information”.
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to be an advantage when compared to languages and notations that are used in other deep inference
systems. Labels are likewise not needed.
As to some other future work, the specific sense of the cut-elimination process suggests that there
are interesting decision procedures that we can get from proof searches in the proposed calculi. The
desirable property is the subformula property, as well as a syntactic calculation of interpolants, among
others.
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